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Introduction 
 
The Case Concerning Oil Platforms, known principally for the contribution 
therein to the law on use of force and self-defence, is overlooked for the 
discussion among its judges of a fundamental question: What is the role of 
the International Court of Justice (further: ICJ, or Court) in the international 
system?1 The eleven separate opinions attached by the judges to the Court’s 
decision suggest the contentiousness of the discussion. Moreover, the case 
was deceptively complex: a complaint about freedom of commerce according 
to a bilateral Treaty of Amity was really a controversy over the use of force 
and self-defence among sworn enemies; and while the record before the 
Court was limited to specific incidents from the late 1980’s, the various 
judges appear to have drawn substantially, in some cases expressly, on the 
public record of world affairs at the beginning of the 21st century. In the 
process, the collection of opinions captures strikingly different visions of the 
ICJ, its powers and its mandate. 
 
This case note progresses in four brief parts. First, I address the factual 
background for the decision. Second, I turn to the jurisprudential 
controversy among the various judges. Third, I review the substance of the 
Court’s decision on use of force. Finally, I focus on the separate opinion of 
Judge Simma and his articulation of Rechtspolitik, as a key to understanding 
the competing roles for the ICJ contemplated by the several judges. I 
conclude by drawing out the relevance of the dispute among the judges with 
reference to a subsequent ICJ case, the Wall Advisory Opinion, and the 
ongoing violence in Gaza. 
 
I. Background 
 
The heart of the record before the court pertained to two separate incidents. 
First, on 19 Oct., 1987, the United States military struck Iran’s Reshadat oil 
installation, damaging platforms connected to that and another complex, the 
Resalat. The attack followed an assertion by the United States of the right to 
self-defence in the wake of various actions attributed to Iran, particularly a 
missile attack on 16 Oct., 1987, destroying a Kuwaiti oil tanker, the Sea Isle 
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City, recently reflagged to the United States.2 Second, on 18 April, 1988, as 
part of a wider operation, the United States military struck and damaged two 
more Iranian oil installations, the Salman and Nasr complexes. The operation 
again followed an assertion by the United States of the right to self-defence 
pursuant to various actions attributed to Iran, particularly a mine that struck 
and damaged the U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts on 14 April, 1988, wounding 
members of the crew.3 
 
The incidents took place in the wider context of the Iran-Iraq War, between 
1980 and 1988. While the history of the Iran-Iraq War is long and sordid, the 
record before the Court focused on relatively narrow aspects. The two 
incidents at the heart of the case were part of the so-called Tanker War 
escalation. As of 1984, both Iran and Iraq began targeting neutral shipping in 
the Gulf in an effort to disrupt one another’s trade. The Kuwaiti vessel 
involved in the first incident, the Sea Isle City, had for this reason reflagged 
under the United States, a protective practice in the region that included 
British and Soviet participation. Waters of the Gulf were mined by both Iraq 
and Iran, and Iran stood accused, among other things, of using its oil 
installations for military purposes, including intelligence and weapons 
deployment. Before the ICJ, Iran acknowledged a military presence on its oil 
platforms, but insisted the purpose was purely defensive.4 
 
The Court delivered its opinion in the wider context of a different conflict 
with Iraq, the 2003 United States invasion. Equally significant was the still-
broader War on Terror following the attacks of 11 Sept., 2001, pursuant to 
which the United States had released the 2002 National Security Strategy 
(NSS). The NSS announced the Bush Doctrine, asserting an unusually broad, 
unilateral right to engage pro-actively in anticipatory self-defence. The 
separate opinions exhibit varying degrees of concern for the 
contemporaneous legal atmosphere. Judge Rigaux, for instance, concludes 
his opinion with critical remarks on the state of U.S. legal scholarship, and 
briefly tours “outdated” Hobbesian political philosophy to denounce in its 
resurgence the spectre of unbridled violence.5 Judge Simma is at once less 
polemical and more comprehensive, calling openly for a Rechtspolitik 
statement in support of increasingly marginalised international rules limiting 
the use of force. I return to this discussion, below. 
 
The procedural history of the case begins in 1992, when Iran first filed suit 
with the ICJ. Though the gravamen of the complaint pertained to the military 
actions of the United States as a peripheral actor in the Iran-Iraq War, Iran 
brought its suit on other grounds: provisions of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, 
Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran 
(Treaty of Amity, or Treaty). The Treaty of Amity provided for automatic 
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arbitration before the ICJ – the only international forum available to Iran, 
and only available, given the Court’s otherwise-applicable limitation to 
consensual jurisdiction, on the terms of the Treaty of Amity. In 1996, by 
preliminary judgment, the Court allowed the suit to proceed pursuant to a 
single provision of the Treaty of Amity, namely Art. X, paragraph 1, 
providing for freedom of commerce and navigation between the territories 
of the two contracting parties. Provisions suggesting broader terms for 
complaint were rejected as incapable of conferring legitimate grounds for 
action.6 In 1998, the Court allowed the United States to proceed with a 
counterclaim on the same Art. X (1), based on Iran’s activities during the 
Tanker War.7 
 
II. Jurisdictional Controversy 
 
The case thus went forward before the ICJ as a matter concerning alleged 
infringement of the freedom of commerce mandated by the Treaty of Amity. 
In its defence, the United States raised, among other arguments, Art. 
XX(1)(d) of the Treaty, which states that the Treaty would in no event 
preclude measures by either party necessary to protect essential security 
interests.8 In its 2003 decision on the merits, the Court took that ball and ran 
with it. In the reasoning of its Opinion, the Court began with the United 
States defence, rather than the complaint itself. The Court explained: 
 
“[I]t appears to the Court that there are particular considerations 
militating in favour of an examination of the application of Article XX, 
paragraph 1(d), before turning to Article X, paragraph 1. It is clear that 
the original dispute between the Parties related to the legality of the 
actions of the United States, in the light of international law on the use 
of force (...). Furthermore, as the United States itself recognizes in its 
Rejoinder, “The self-defence issues presented in this case raise matters 
of the highest importance to all members of the international 
community”, and both Parties are agreed as to the importance of the 
implications of the case in the field of the use of force, even though 
they draw opposite conclusions from this observation. The Court 
therefore considers that, to the extent that its jurisdiction under Article 
XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty authorizes it to examine and rule 
on such issues, it should do so.”9 
 
The question, of course, was precisely whether or to what degree the Treaty 
of Amity conferred jurisdiction on the Court to pass judgment on the use of 
force, despite the otherwise narrow grounds for complaint accorded by the 
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Treaty. Having signalled its intention to effect such judgment, the Court 
equated the term “necessary to protect essential security interests” with the 
standard for self-defence under customary law and Art. 51 of the Charter of 
the United Nations (UN Charter), thereby decoupling its judgment from the 
Treaty of Amity. With recourse instead to international law generally, the 
Court found the actions of the United States not to qualify as legitimate acts 
of self-defence, but inappropriate uses of force. Having thus dismissed the 
defence, the Court then turned back to the complaint – and dismissed that as 
well. Ultimately, the Court held that the actions of the United States did not 
constitute an infringement of commerce between the two countries as 
contemplated by the terms of the Treaty of Amity any more than they 
constituted legitimate self-defence. 
 
The Court’s decision to review a defence before the substance of the 
complaint was telling. Still more provocative, the Court began its dispositif, the 
operational portion of its opinion, by repeating its rejection of the United 
States’ defence, despite having already signalled in its reasoning that Iran’s 
substantive claim was without merit.10 As a matter of operational decision, 
logic suggests that a meritless complaint entails no defence. Judge Kooijmans 
emphasises the irregularity with a review of Court precedent: 
 
“The operative part does not immediately respond to the claim as 
formulated by the Applicant, but starts with a finding not essential to 
the Court’s decision on that claim (…). I have checked the operative 
parts of all judgments of this Court and its predecessor, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, in contentious cases and none of them 
starts with a finding that is not determinative for the Court’s 
disposition of the claim.”11 
 
Following the Rechtspolitik of Judge Simma, however, the decision was not 
provocative enough: “the Court has fulfilled what I consider to be its duty 
(…) with inappropriate restraint”.12 
 
Judge Simma’s choice of words succinctly suggest the crucial question: what 
is the duty of the Court? A question of jurisdiction is a question of the 
powers available to a court – and with powers available, duty incumbent – 
but the Court misses this line of inquiry by concentrating instead on the 
“original dispute”. Judge Ranjeva, sympathetic to the Court’s method, 
perhaps unwittingly suggests the dangers of attempting to purport a real or 
original dispute independent of the formal pleadings. He applauds 
overcoming “artificial” aspects of the case, but concedes that “[d]efining the 
‘cause’ of a claim – the underlying reason therefore – is a controversial issue 
                                                
10 Idem, Dispositif para. (1). 
11 Kooijmans, para. 3. And see the opinion of Judge Parra-Aranguren at para. 13: “the 
Court should have considered Article XX, paragraph 1(d), as a defence to be examined 
only in the event of its having previously established that the United States had violated 
Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty”. 
12 Simma, p. 325. 
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in doctrine because of the notion’s malleable character and metaphysical 
connotations”.13 The somewhat mystical suggestion of divining a complaint 
is not helped when he explains that “[i]n thus going directly to the real heart 
of the dispute, the Court has complied with its obligation (…) to make a true 
interpretation of substantive law”, whatever that means.14 
 
Judge Elaraby also adopts the focus of the Court: “The case, in essence, is 
about international responsibility. It evolves around whether it is permissible 
for a State to use force against another State outside the boundaries defined 
by the Charter of the United Nations”.15 This was indeed the issue Iran 
wanted to litigate, as Judge Higgins explained: 
 
“The Court was in 1996 well aware that there was a general dispute 
between the Parties in which each claimed unlawful uses of force by 
the other. Certainly Iran has been interested in seeking a basis of 
jurisdiction that could allow it to proceed with substantive claims 
relating to the United States’ uses of force. The emphasis put by Iran, 
in the preliminary objections, on Article I of the Treaty was but one 
element of many evidencing that its real and only interest lay in the use 
of force.”16 
 
As Judge Owada points out, it is in the nature of a court of limited 
jurisdiction – rather than a court with plenary authority to rule as it pleases – 
that “the dispute before the Court is as defined by the Parties in their 
submissions to this Court. The so-called ‘original dispute between the 
Parties’ has no direct legal relevance to this dispute before the Court.”17 
Moreover, the scope of the dispute before the Court was the subject of the 
1996 Judgment, prompting Judge Higgins likewise to observe that  
 
“‘[t]he original dispute’ is of no relevance at the present time and it is 
inappropriate that in 2003 the Court should now treat Article X, 
paragraph 1, as an afterthought to ‘the original dispute’ over which in 
1996 it did not find it had jurisdiction (…). Invocations of the ‘original 
dispute’ and ‘importance’ of subject-matter cannot serve to transform a 
contingent defence into a subject-matter that is ‘desirable’ to deal with 
in the text of the Judgment and in the dispositi.f”.18 
 
In formally purporting to remain within the jurisdiction conferred by the 
Treaty of Amity, while nonetheless basing the substance of its opinion 
squarely on the use of force as a matter of international law, the Court 
effectively outstripped its own institutional capacity. Moreover, by doing so 
in a manner ultimately irrelevant to the disposition of the case, the Court 
made relatively clear an expansive interest in its own authority. 
 
                                                
13 Ranjeva, para. 6. 
14 Idem, para. 3. 
15 Elaraby, para. 1.1. 
16 Higgins, para. 19. 
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18 Higgins, paras. 22-23. 
137 AMSTERDAM LAW FORUM VOL 1:2 
The expansive interest attributable to the Court makes up the better part of 
the dispute among the judges in the remarkable number of separate opinions 
attached to the case. Judges Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, 
Buergenthal and Owada all expressed discomfort or disapproval with the 
Court’s principal ruling on the use of force under international law; Judges 
Ranjeva and Koroma wrote separately to support the ruling; and Judges Al-
Khasawneh, Elaraby, Simma and Rigaux all wrote to indicate that the Court 
could and should have gone still farther in taking the opportunity to 
pronounce on violations of the international legal prohibition on the use of 
force. Among the latter four, Judges Elaraby and Simma were most 
pronounced in their discontent with the scope of the Court’s ruling, and 
between the two, Judge Simma was most comprehensive and visionary in his 
statement of the powers available to the Court. His opinion serves as a sort 
of key by which to understand the startling different visions among the 
various judges of the role and powers of the ICJ and the nature of the 
international system generally. Before proceeding to Judge Simma’s opinion, 
it is useful to review the substance of the Court’s use of force decision; I turn 
to that now. 
 
III. Use of Force 
 
Considered independent of the complex of concerns caught up with 
the jurisdictional question, much of the Court’s reasoning on self-
defence is not terribly controversial. Likewise, the first, critical 
manoeuvre to draw on international law is not unreasonable:  
 
“[U]nder the general rules of treaty interpretation, as reflected in the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, interpretation must 
take into account “any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties” (Art. 31, para. 3(c)). The Court 
cannot accept that Article XX, paragraph 1(d), of the Treaty was 
intended to operate wholly independently of the relevant rules of 
international law on the use of force, so as to be capable of being 
successfully invoked, even in the limited context of a claim for breach 
of the Treaty, in relation to an unlawful use of force.”19 
 
The Court proceeds along two principle lines of inquiry. First, the United 
States was called on to demonstrate that it was the victim of an armed attack, 
requiring a showing of (a) substantial aggressive force, pursuant to which (b) 
the attack must have been attributable to Iran, with (c) the specific intent to 
strike the United States. Second, the United States was called on to 
demonstrate that its actions were (a) necessary and (b) proportionate, 
according to which the Court also included inquiry into (c) the nature of the 
targets of defensive force. 
 
The armed attacks to which the United States responded must have been “of 
such a nature as to be qualified as ‘armed attacks’ within the meaning of that 
                                                
19 Opinion, para. 41. 
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expression in Article 51 [of the UN Charter] (…) and as understood in 
customary law on the use of force”.20 The Court emphasised the distinction 
between “the most grave forms of the use of force”, qualifying as armed attacks, 
and “other less grave forms”, which will not qualify for purposes of Art. 51. 
Moreover, as noted, the Court linked the armed attack threshold to a showing of 
specific intent on the part of Iran. The Court explains: “the question is whether 
[the] attack, either in itself or in combination with the rest of the “series of (…) 
attacks” cited by the United States can be categorised as an “armed attack” on 
the United States justifying self-defence”. The Court notes first that the Sea Isle 
City was in Kuwaiti waters at the time of the attack on it, and that a Silkworm 
missile fired from (it is alleged) more than 100 km away could not have been 
aimed at the specific vessel, but simply programmed to hit some target in 
Kuwaiti waters. Secondly, the Texaco Caribbean, whatever its ownership, was 
not flying a United States flag, so that an attack on the vessel is not in itself to be 
equated with an attack on that State (…). [And t]here is no evidence that the 
minelaying alleged to have been carried out by the Iran Ajr, at a time when Iran 
was at war with Iraq, was aimed specifically at the United States; and similarly it 
has not been established that the mine struck by the Bridgeton was laid with the 
specific intention of harming that ship, or other United States vessels.21 
 
Accordingly, the United States with respect to both incidents failed to establish 
that it was the victim of an armed attack under international law sufficient to 
allow unilateral action in self-defence.22 The demand for proof of specific 
intent on the part of Iran to strike the United States in particular was not 
uncontroversial, but holds obvious appeal within the context of the UN 
collective security system: the ruling bars self-help and avoids escalation in 
the face of generalised violence, presumptively vesting an exclusive 
responsive right with the collective apparatus of the UN. 
 
The Court proceeded to the criteria of necessity and proportionality, despite 
the failure by the United States to meet the armed attack threshold. The 
analysis of both criteria, however, is somewhat thin. Both appear to come 
down to the Court’s controversial use of the evidence on the record, and its 
equally problematic reliance on the nature of the target of the defensive 
force. As regards proportionality, the Court simply states that the 1987 
actions might indeed have met proportionality (the point is moot because the 
armed attack threshold was not met), but goes on to say of the 1988 incident, 
in conclusive fashion, that  
 
                                                
20 Idem, para. 51. 
21 Idem, para. 64. 
22 The same conclusion can be put otherwise by unbundling the various elements of the 
Art. 51 inquiry, particularly the components of severity and responsibility. Thus, Pieter 
Bekker, reviewing the case, writes of the minelaying allegation, “the Court concluded that, 
although it fell within the meaning of ‘armed attack’ in Article 51 of the UN Charter and as 
understood in customary law on the use of force, the mining of the U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts 
was insufficient in itself to amount to such an attack by Iran that would justify U.S. action 
in self-defense”. Pieter H. F. Bekker, International Decisions, David D. Caron, (ed.), 98 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 550, 53 (2004). 
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“[a]s a response to the mining, by an unidentified agency, of a single 
United States warship, which was severely damaged but not sunk, and 
without loss of life, neither ‘Operation Praying Mantis’ as a whole, nor 
even that part of it that destroyed the Salman and Nasr platforms, can 
be regarded, in the circumstances of this case, as a proportionate use of 
force in self-defence”.23  
 
As regards necessity, the Court “notes that there is no evidence that the 
United States complained to Iran of the military activities of the platforms, in 
the same way as it complained repeatedly of minelaying and attacks on 
neutral shipping, which does not suggest that the targeting of the platforms 
was seen as a necessary act”.24 
 
The quoted passage on necessity seems to indicate that the record might 
establish necessity with respect to Iran’s minelaying activities and attacks on 
neutral shipping – the primary acts complained of in the incidents of April, 
1988, and Oct., 1987, respectively – but that necessity was not met with 
specific reference to the platforms elected as targets for defensive response. 
In part this was due to finding that the United States did not carry a burden 
of proof to show that the oil installations were being used for aggressive 
military purposes: the Court held, without further defining its evidentiary 
standard, that while the United States’ showing was “suggestive”, even 
“highly suggestive”, it was not conclusive.25 With respect to the Court’s focus 
on the nature of the defensive target, however, the terminology raises a 
potentially troubling confusion of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The Court held: 
“One aspect of [the criteria of necessity and proportionality] is the nature of 
the target of the force used avowedly in self-defence”.26 Proportionality by 
any recognised use under the jus ad bellum will inevitably take account of the 
contemplated targets, but the term itself is generally reserved for 
humanitarian law: confusion between the two effects confusion between the 
right to respond in self-defence, and the nature of the activities allowed once 
that right is ascertained. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore such 
confusion, but I note that the Court’s reasoning shows less than thorough 
sensitivity to distinctions across the two fields of law. Accordingly, the 
Court’s lack of clarity in its discussion of necessity, proportionality and 
targeting standards opened the door to the critical response by William H. 
Taft, legal advisor to the United States:  
 
“There is no requirement in international law that a State exercising its 
right of self-defence must use the same degree or type of force used by 
the attacking State in its most recent attack. Rather, the proportionality 
of the measures taken in self-defence is to be judged according to the 
nature of the threat being addressed.”.27 
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24 Idem, para. 76. 
25 Idem, paras. 59, 71. 
26 Idem, para. 74. 
27 William H. Taft, IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 295, 305 
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To draw this discussion to a close, however, the Court’s opinion in sum – 
though achieving less than perfect clarity in all respects – suggests a strong 
affirmation of the commonplace ban on reprisals, though the Court does not 
use that term. Judge Elaraby likewise states that “the United States military 
action against Iran must be considered as military reprisals” and regrets that 
the Court was not more explicit on that ground by way of obiter dictum.28 
Judge Simma shared similar discontent; I turn to his opinion at last. 
 
IV. Judge Simma’s Opinion 
 
Judge Simma indicates his satisfaction with the Court’s opinion, as well as his 
discontent, when he applauds the “confirmation, albeit too hesitant, of the 
jus cogens of the United Nations Charter”.29 The overriding consideration, for 
Judge Simma, is one of “Rechtspolitik”, according to which the Court has 
rightly “taken the opportunity, offered by United States reliance on Article 
XX of the 1955 Treaty, to state its view on the legal limits on the use of force 
at a moment when these limits find themselves under the greatest stress”.30 
The statement is baldly political in nature, and explicitly endorses 
opportunism in pursuit of an ends particular to the interests of the Court. 
Moreover, given that the moment of decision occurs fifteen years after the 
moment of controversy before the Court, Judge Simma’s language suggests 
pushing the Court’s review beyond the more or less narrow parameters of 
the case at hand, making expedients of the parties and controversy. 
 
Needless to say, Judge Simma’s Opinion represents a radical break from 
traditional judicial method. His is a broader interest in policy and politics: 
“From the viewpoint of legal policy and political relevance (…) there can be 
no doubt that in the present case the emphasis is squarely on the question of 
the legality vel non of the use of armed force by the United States against the 
oil platforms”.31 By reference to the policy and politics attendant on the 
outcome of the Court’s decision, Judge Simma avoids the ontological 
distraction of discerning the true or original complaint between the parties. 
The distinction is at once subtle and broad: like Judge Ranjeva, Judge Simma 
suggests that adjudicating the use of force was more important than 
adjudicating the pleadings on their face; Judge Simma, however, is not 
confined to justifying his Opinion by reference to the parties or their dispute, 
with recourse instead to a policy concerned with matters of “political 
relevance”, wholly external to the record. The question, then, is on what 
grounds, according to what powers and what policy, does the Court account 
for political relevance in its role as tribunal? 
 
                                                
28 Elaraby, para. 1.2. 
29 Simma, p. 325. 
30 Idem, p. 325. 
31 Idem, para. 3. 
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In answer, Judge Simma falls back on principle and a sense of significance: “I 
consider it of utmost importance, and a matter of principle, for the Court to 
pronounce itself on questions of the threat or use of force in international 
relations whenever it is given the opportunity to do so”.32 Thus: 
 
“We currently find ourselves at the outset of an extremely controversial 
debate on the further viability of the limits on unilateral military force 
established by the United Nations Charter. In this debate, “supplied” 
with a case allowing it to do so, the Court ought to take every 
opportunity to secure that the voice of the law of the Charter rise 
above the current cacophony.”33 
 
Judge Owada, however, counters that “it is crucial to keep in mind that in the 
present case the competence of the Court is limited to the examination of the 
claims of the Applicant under Article X, paragraph 1, and does not extend to 
the examination of a broader and general problem of self-defence under 
general international law as such.”34 Competence, in Judge Owada’s 
formulation, is more than a formal constraint: it captures institutional 
limitation in actual fact. Thus, he continues,  
 
“while it is of the utmost importance for the Court to pronounce its 
authoritative position on this general problem in the proper context, it 
should do so in a context where it should be possible for the Court to 
deal with problem squarely in a full-fledged manner, with all its 
ramifications both in terms of the law and the facts involved.”.35  
 
The Court is at once bound by the contrasting universal and particular 
aspects of its adjudication: the power to effect universal rules should call for 
restraint in application to a particular problem stated according to a particular 
record developed by parties with interests particular to themselves. 
 
Judge Buergenthal, along with Judge Higgins, raises the non ultra petita rule 
(roughly translated as ‘not more than asked for’): “the function of the non 
ultra petita rule is to ensure that the Court does not exceed the jurisdictional 
confines spelled out by the parties in their final submissions”.36 Judge Simma 
contemplates a Court tasked with defending the Law, Judge Buergenthal a 
Court tasked with administering the law. The former accords the Court an 
active pre-eminence; the latter subjugates the Court to a system calibrated 
among divergent actors and interests. Judge Buergenthal cites approvingly 
from Fitzmaurice: “The non ultra petita rule is not only an inevitable corollary 
– indeed, virtually a part of the general principle of consent of the parties as 
the basis of international jurisdiction – it is also a necessary rule, for without 
                                                
32 Idem, para. 5. 
33 Idem, para. 6. 
34 Owada, para. 37. 
35 Idem, para. 38. 
36 Buergenthal, para. 8. 
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it the consent principle itself could constantly be circumvented”.37 Judge 
Simma, for his part, states: 
 
“I find it regrettable that the Court has not mustered the courage of 
restating, and thus reconfirming, more fully fundamental principles of 
the law of the United Nations as well as customary international law 
(principles that in my view are of the nature of jus cogens) on the use of 
force, or rather the prohibition on armed force, in a context and at a 
time when such a reconfirmation is called for with the greatest 
urgency.”38 
 
Judge Higgins, on the other hand, asks “conversely, if the use of force on 
armed attack and self-defence is to be judicially examined, is the appropriate 
way to do so through the eye of the needle that is the freedom of commerce 
clause of a 1955 FCN Treaty?”.39 She answers her own question in the 
negative: “These questions are of such a complexity and importance that they 
require a different sort of pleading and a different type of case”.40 
 
Dissonance lingers in the twin objections of Judges Higgins and Buergenthal. 
The subject matter is too important or the system too carefully calibrated, the 
one and the other suggest, to reach beyond the jurisdictional bounds of the 
Court. The latter, however, denies the relevance of the former, and vice 
versa, such that the one must hold sway to the detriment of the other as a 
matter of law. The Court is caught in the middle. In the meantime, Judge 
Simma forcefully laments:  
 
“What we cannot but see outside the courtroom is that, more and 
more, legal justification of use of force within the system of the United 
Nations Charter is discarded even as a fig leaf, while an increasing 
number of writers appear to prepare for the outright funeral of 
international legal limitations on the use of force.”41  
 
Even here, though, some temperance is in order: the international rules on 
the use of force have been reported dead before, and the concern has been 
exaggerated, if not always greatly.42 
 
Conclusion 
 
Less than a year after announcing the Oil Platforms decision, the ICJ 
announced its advisory opinion concerning ‘Legal Consequences of the 
                                                
37 Idem, para. 8, citing Geral Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International 
Court of Justice, Vol. II, p. 529 (1986). 
38 Simma, para. 6. 
39 Higgins, para. 26. 
40 Idem, para. 26. 
41 Simma, para. 6. 
42 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of 
Force by States, 64 Am. J. Int’l L. 809, 820-21 (1970); and Louis Henkin, The Reports of the 
Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 Am. J. Int’l L. 544 (1971). 
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Construction of A Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’.43 Israel 
declined to address the case on the merits, suggesting disapproval that the 
Court was being used as a political football.44 The precise procedural issues 
were different from those of Oil Platforms, but the general controversy over 
the propriety of the Court’s review was similar. And the world today is 
confronted with the ongoing violence in Gaza: did the Wall Opinion help or 
hinder matters? Was the international system served by the Court’s opinion 
or undermined by it? There are no clear answers to these questions – it is not 
even certain that these are the right questions to be asking, and it is well 
beyond the scope of this note to turn to the Wall Opinion now in any 
substance. I raise the case in broad outline here as illustration because the 
questions put are raised forcefully by the Court and judges in the Oil Platforms 
Opinion, alongside differing visions of the international system and the ICJ’s 
role in it. They demand engagement, even if they defy resolution. 
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